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Katherine Ziomek

I. Introduction
The current rhetoric regarding Japan’s demographics is that the country is facing
a crisis. Since WW II, the Japanese birth rate has been falling, and there are fears
that the Japanese population is aging without replacement. This crisis is, however,
the result of traditional Japanese values and perspectives on marriage, women,
child-bearing, and immigration. Although the current demographic crisis raises
concerns about the future of the ethnic Japanese population, it is important to discuss and acknowledge the ways in which Japanese society created the conditions
for this crisis to take place.
I begin with a statement about the scope of this paper regarding conceptions of gender and limitations of research. Next I outline the current state
of demographics in Japan. Additionally, since low birth rates and increasing life
expectancy are resulting in an aging population, I examine the current and future
implications of an aging population in Japan, including the physical and financial vulnerability of the elderly. Then, I discuss reasons for the changing demographics of Japan, including the status of women, perspectives toward working
wives and mothers, and the changing field of employment in Japan. Finally, I
explore some solutions to the demographic crisis that have been recommended or
attempted, and I finish by supporting one potential solution: immigration reform.
i. Limitations of research

In this paper, I discuss marriage and child-bearing in Japan. This discussion is limited in scope, given that I focus on cisgender females and cisgender males, terms
that describe individuals who identify with the gender they were assigned at birth.
Another limitation is that the statements and research presented in the newspaper
articles and peer-reviewed journal articles that I consulted for this paper focus on
cisgender heterosexual relationships. Although Japan is becoming more tolerant of
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the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer/questioning (LGBTQ) community, same-sex marriage has not yet been legalized (Tai), and as such, discussions
of child-bearing are limited to heterosexual relationships. I would recommend that
further research be conducted on the relationship between the Japanese LGBTQ
community and beliefs regarding child-bearing, birth rates, the demographic crisis,
and concerns regarding the growing elderly population. Additionally, using data
from the World Bank Group, I constructed graphs to illustrate how the demographics in Japan are changing. However, when separating data by “gender,” the World
Bank Group does not include specifications other than “male” or “female,” which
tend to refer to cisnormative gender identities. The fact that this data does not
acknowledge non-cisgender identities represents a limitation in the research and a
potential bias in the data collection, yet I will retain the binary terminology in order
to maintain consistency and facilitate replicability.
II. Demographics in Japan
In Japan, the average household size decreased from 4.8 members to 2.4 members
between 1920 and 2010 with a decrease of 5% occurring between 2005 and 2010
(Schröder et al. 761, 762). In addition, since 2005, the death rate in Japan has been
greater than the birth rate, which has resulted in a demographic crisis for the country
(Schieder 15). Since the birth rate is lower than the death rate, concerns regarding
population replacement and population growth are understandably high. Projections
suggest that by 2060, the Japanese population will decrease from 127 million to 87
million (“Why the Japanese Are Having So Few Babies”).
Utilizing data compiled by the World Bank Group, I created the graphs in
the Appendixes that demonstrate pertinent demographic trends in Japan.1 The graph
in Appendix A shows the decreasing birth rate in relation to the death rate in Japan.
Since the mid-1970s, the crude birth rate (defined as the birth rate per 1000 people)
has been decreasing while the crude death rate (defined as the death rate per 1000
people) has a U-shaped trend, steadily increasing since the 1980s. While both rates
fluctuate, since 2007 the crude death rate has been higher than the crude birth rate,
with the difference between the two rates becoming more pronounced (the World
Bank Group).
Appendix B, combined with Appendix C and Appendix D, provides an
accurate picture of changing population patterns in Japan. The graph in Appendix
B demonstrates the percentage of the population aged sixty-five and above in Japan.
In 2013, the percentage of Japanese aged sixty-five and above hit 25% and continues to increase, reaching 25.41% in 2014 (the World Bank Group). The first year
I have previously done research on the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster and included graphs created using data from the World Bank Group, which included data up to the year 2012 or 2013, depending on the indicators.
The graphs present in this paper are updated versions with data to 2014 for all indicators discussed in this paper.

1.

http://scholars.wlu.ca/luja/vol4/iss1/6

2

Ziomek: A Country in Crisis: The Changing Demographics of Japan

ZIOMEK

35

with data available in the World Bank Group’s data is 1960, and the percentage of
the elderly population in Japan was 5.73% in that year. It is clear that there was a
pronounced increase in the percentage of Japanese aged sixty-five and above from
1960 to 2014 and that a very different population structure exists in Japan today
than in previous years.
Appendix C provides additional insight into the percentage of Japanese
society that survives until age sixty-five grouped by “male” and “female.” Since
1960, the percentage of both males and females that reach the age of sixty-five
has increased. In 2014, 94.01% of females lived until age sixty-five and 88.04%
of males lived until age sixty-five (the World Bank Group). Thus, in Japan, an
increasing percentage of individuals are aged sixty-five and over in any given
year. In addition, Appendix D depicts the increasing life expectancy of Japanese
individuals. These trends illustrate that the life expectancy of males, females,
and the total population is increasing.2 In 2014, life expectancy at birth reached
86.83, 80.5, and 83.59 for females, males, and the total population respectively
(the World Bank Group). In sum, these statistics illustrate the following trends in
Japan’s demographics: the crude birth rate is decreasing and the crude death rate
is increasing. Additionally, the percentage of the total population that is sixty-five
and above is increasing, the share of the total population living to sixty-five and
above is increasing, and the life expectancy for Japanese individuals is increasing.
i. Implications of an Aging Population

In Japan, there are several factors that result in an aging population. First, the birth
rate is declining. Second, the life expectancy in Japan is increasing incrementally.
One implication of an aging population is a larger financial burden on younger
generations in Japan due to the costs associated with maintaining elder healthcare
and pension payments (Schieder 15).
During the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami disaster, one
major implication of an aging population became clear, namely an increased vulnerability to natural disasters. Given that Japan experiences approximately 1,000
tremors each year and is prone to earthquakes (Cyranoski 392), the percentage of the
Japanese population that is vulnerable to earthquake and tsunami-related negative
health outcomes will increase. In the 2011 disaster, there were estimates of over
20,000 deaths (Lay and Kanamori 33), and “65% of the dead were over 60 years
old” (UNESCO and IOC 3). Additionally, elderly individuals are more vulnerable
to negative health outcomes, and following the disaster, the elderly population
specifically was affected by influenza A (H3N2) (Kamigaki et al. 2, 6), pneumonia

A notable exception is the visible “dip” in the graph. This dip represents the year 2011, which was when the Great East
Japan Earthquake occurred.
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(4), mental illness (Matanle 837), and trauma in farming communities as a result of
being forced to evacuate land that was passed down through generations (Sugimoto
et al. 630).
Another aspect of the elderly population’s vulnerability to disasters is a
lack of mobility. Mobility was a concern in this disaster, given that such a high
percentage of the total deaths were among those aged sixty and over, 92.5% of
these deaths being drowning related (Matanle 836–837). Given that Japan is
prone to earthquakes, the increasing vulnerability of an aging population evokes
compassion and concern for the well-being of the elderly, with additional concerns regarding the financial costs of an aging population. Since the aggregate
number of elderly individuals is increasing, the result will be greater financial
costs to the state and taxpayers who will have to pay for the healthcare of elderly
individuals following disasters and trauma. That being said, this acknowledgement is not intended to further victimize or to blame the elderly for their vulnerability during times of disaster; it is important to recognize all of the implications
of the demographic crisis, including financial implications.
III. Reasons for Demographic Change
i. Japanese women as wives and mothers

In Japan, there is a traditional idea of what life looks like: “male-breadwinner–
female-homemaker” (Piotrowski et al. 1040). Increasingly, however, Japanese individuals are choosing to delay or postpone marriage. In 2010, 60.3% of women aged
25–29 had never married (Fukuda 107). One reason why many Japanese individuals
choose to delay or opt out of marriage is due to financial considerations (“Why the
Japanese Are Having So Few Babies”). In Japan, weddings are expensive—costing
3.2 million yen, or 40,000 dollars, on average (“The dearth of births”). Because
of cultural norms, having children out of wedlock in Japan is extremely rare, and
therefore the declining rate of marriage is related to the declining birth rate. Since
the rate of marriage is declining, there is a subsequent decline in total births—only
about 2% of total births occur outside of wedlock (Fukuda 108; “Why the Japanese
Are Having So Few Babies”).
In Japan, when a woman is in the workforce and then becomes a mother,
she faces difficulties in both her work and personal life. In their article, Cooper
and Hagiwara recount several interviews they conducted with Japanese women
who described their lived experiences as women who have had to choose between
childbearing and their careers. One Japanese woman, Terue Suzuki, described her
experience as a working wife and mother after having children. Suzuki explained,
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“I had a satisfying job and really wanted to go back to it. In Japanese society,
when a woman chooses work instead of staying at home to look after her husband,
she’s called a devil wife” (Cooper and Hagiwara). The lived experience of another
Japanese woman, Yoko Ogata, provides insight into several layers of traditional
Japanese attitudes toward women, marriage, childbearing, careers, and how they
impact Japanese women. Ogata stated, “I wanted to have kids but I kept putting it
off because I wanted to gain recognition for my work.” Additionally, Ogata married
a co-worker, but “colleagues told her to ‘be a good wife,’ while others told her husband he ‘shouldn’t make his wife continue working’” (Cooper and Hagiwara). At
the age of thirty-six, a time when she was being given a great deal of responsibility
and control at work, Ogata became pregnant and experienced a miscarriage. She
stated, “my husband and mother-in-law were very angry and asked if I hadn’t had a
miscarriage on purpose.” Following this, Ogata and her husband divorced (Cooper
and Hagiwara). Unfortunately, these perspectives toward working women in Japan
are not rare. In 2010, a survey of 6,000 Japanese couples found that “70 percent
of respondents said mothers should stop working when their children are small to
focus on raising them” (Cooper and Hagiwara). As these statistics illustrates, the
opinion that women cannot simultaneously be mothers and have careers is common
in Japan, providing a social obstacle for Japanese women.
ii. Working in Japan

The availability of work and the changing expectations of workers in Japan also
has had an impact on the country’s demographics. The Japanese have created the
expression “freeter,” which refers to “part-time workers between the ages of 15
and 34, not students, and not married if female” (Cook 36; Piotrowski et al. 1040).
The number of “freeters” in Japan has increased since the 1990s, with the ratio of
irregular to regular employees being 22.1% in 2012 for males (Cook 36). According
to Japanese society, “freeters” can be described as follows:
… layabout youths who lack a work ethic and shirk their responsibilities to
the nation … victims of the changing employment market and long recession
… and contributors to the demographic woes that Japan is facing through
their limited social welfare contributions and their low rate of marriage. (37)
In Japan, research suggests that male “freeters,” or irregular employees, marry less,
as they “have difficulty maintaining long-term romantic relations and transitioning
from dating to marriage, in part because of their irregular employment status and
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low breadwinning ability” (Cook 37). Additionally, research suggests that males
working in temporary or non-regular jobs are “more likely to postpone marriage”
(Piotrowski et al. 1040). The trouble with temporary or non-regular jobs is their
lack of permanence.
In the post–WW II period in Japan, the conception of work was called a
“standard employment relationship,” which was a permanent, full-time job with
benefits (1040). In Japan, the relationship between a male “breadwinner” and female
“homemaker” assumes that standard employment is a given, especially since some
companies in Japan used to provide lifetime employment and guarantees of promotion, ensuring that workers’ families were cared for (1040). This is no longer the
case in Japan. Neo-liberal economic influences changed the nature of employment
in Japan. While the Japanese economy was suffering in the early 1990s, companies began to focus on cost reduction, and social insurance made it cheaper to hire
non-regular workers instead of regular workers. Furthermore, in the 2000s, Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi began to deregulate the Japanese economy following
the models from the Thatcher–Reagan era (1041). Currently, non-regular workers
account for “over one third of the entire workforce, or more than 20 million workers” (1041). As a result, neo-liberal social and economic policies affected a significant proportion of the Japanese population, and these policies played a large part
in creating the conditions for the current demographic crisis. There is an empirical
relationship between a non-regular male worker in Japan and a diminished likelihood of marriage (1051). Importantly, temporary work is becoming a permanent
part of the Japanese lived experience since it “has a stigmatizing and negative effect
on the acquisition of future employment as a regular worker,” and the majority of
temporary workers are young or middle-aged males (1041).
Another outcome of the current situation of temporary workers in Japan is
the phenomenon of “parasite singles.” In 2004, Masahiro Yamada described “parasite singles” as single, adult individuals who continue living with their parents for
an extended period of time due to economic constraints such as working part-time
jobs (Schieder 17, 18).3 In Japan, there is a cultural expectation that children are
the responsibility of their parents, and once the parents become elders, the caretaking responsibility shifts to the children (Fukuda 108). However, it is becoming
increasingly difficult for Japanese youth to transition into permanent work that can
cover the cost of a wedding or independent living because of job insecurity and
the lack of opportunities for good-paying jobs (Fukuda 108). As a result, a greater
number of young Japanese individuals continue to live with their parents well into
adulthood.
3.
It is important to note that while “parasite singles” can be female or male, the term has been used to criticize single
women in Japan, and the term can also be used to mean a woman “rejecting the austerity of marriage and children, preferring conspicuous consumption” (Schieder 15).
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It is important to acknowledge difficulties that women face in the traditional
Japanese workplace. Since many Japanese companies hire university graduates with
the expectation of permanent, lifelong employment, Japanese women face difficulties making progress in their careers if they take a break to have children (“Holding
Back Half the Nation”). In Japan, women have a labour-force participation rate
of 63%. Additionally, 70% of Japanese women do not work for a decade or more
after the birth of their first child and many never return to work at all, so there is a
concern that the potential of Japanese women is being neglected (“Holding Back
Half the Nation”). However, societal concern over unused female brain power is
hardly new. Writing in the 19th century, Mill stated that increased equality between
women and men would ultimately benefit society:
[There would be a] doubling [of] the mass of mental faculties available for
the higher service of humanity. Where there is now one person qualified to
benefit mankind and promote the general improvement, as a public teacher,
or an administrator of some branch of public or social affairs, there would
then be a chance of two. (81)
Mill acknowledged that integrating and supporting women more effectively in
the workforce would be to the benefit of all. Unfortunately, many of the inequalities Mill identified remain major issues for Japanese women in the 21st century,
effectively resulting in the underutilization of half of the population. Given the
many difficulties the Japanese population will face as its demographics shift,
this failure to embrace working women is especially problematic. There are several potential solutions to this crisis, which I explore in the following section,
but if Japan truly wishes to address the future challenges posed by the demographic shift, then improving the status of women in Japan must be a priority.
IV. Possible Solutions to Demographic Change
The demographic crisis is clearly affecting various sectors of Japanese society and
evokes concern and emotion from government officials. At this point, it is important
to ask the following question: How can the Japanese government encourage positive population growth in non-invasive and socially beneficial ways? Previously,
the Japanese government has used different strategies to try to increase the birth
rate “including a ‘women’s handbook’ to educate young females on the high and
low points of their fertility, and state-sponsored matchmaking events” (“Why the
Japanese Are Having So Few Babies”). Additionally, the government has invested
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in child benefits and daycare centres; however, these strategies have not been successful (“The dearth of births”). In this section, I discuss some of these strategies
as well as some other potentially viable strategies that the Japanese government
may consider.
As stated by Mill, women who are forced to not work or forced to choose
not to work are a large source of unutilized potential in society. Thus, a recent
strategy proposed by the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzō Abe, is promising. In
response to a shrinking birth rate combined with a shrinking economy, Abe has
implemented his “Abenomics” growth strategy (“Holding Back Half the Nation”).
This strategy attempts to bring awareness and practical solutions to the issue of
how women are viewed in Japan, and his speeches cover topics including operating
hours of kindergartens and breastfeeding when outside the home (“Holding Back
Half the Nation”). With this strategy, Abe’s goal is not only for more women to
work but also for women to be more successful in their careers. For example, “by
2020 Mr. Abe wants women to occupy 30% of all ‘leadership’ positions—which
would include members of parliament, heads of local government and corporate
executives” (“Holding Back Half the Nation”). Moreover, Wingfield-Hayes (2013)
writes that Abe’s strategy stands a good chance of succeeding:
Evidence from Europe and America suggest helping women to stay in work
can increase the birth rate. In countries like Sweden, Denmark and the US,
where female employment rates are high, birth rates are also higher. In countries where female employment is low, like Italy, South Korea and Japan,
birth rates are also low.
Since the goal is ultimately to increase the birth rate in Japan, evidence suggests
that improving the status of working women in Japan will have a positive impact
on this goal. Thus, bringing awareness to the struggles Japanese women face and
helping them maintain their working status regardless of their family structures
will help to increase the birth rate. Unfortunately, being a woman who has a family,
raises children, and builds a career is not currently accommodated in the structure
of Japanese society. Cooper and Hagiwara (2012) write that in Japan, there are only
166 childcare places per 10,000 people, as compared to 2010 in the UK and 365 in
Australia, making childcare scarcity another barrier for working Japanese women.
The Japanese women who fight through social disapproval and wish to continue
working after having children may struggle to do so because of the low number of
daycare centres, the long waiting lists, and the high cost (Wingfield-Hayes). One
practical solution that Abe has implemented “has been to try to shorten waiting lists
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for child care by allowing more private companies into a previously state-dominated
sector” (“Holding Back Half the Nation”). Increasing the number of daycares available and thereby allowing more children into daycare will eliminate this barrier for
many mothers who wish to continue working. It is possible that eventually some
women in Japan will choose to become working mothers if they have superior
childcare options available to them.
One possible solution to the demographic crisis is immigration reform.
Immigration reform is a complicated issue for an ethnically homogenous nation
like Japan, and consequently many oppose this idea (Wohns 6). Recently there
has been political support for this reformation, including the 2008 proposal from
Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party “to increase the number of immigrants to 10%
of the population” (Wohns 6). Even so, Japan currently has immigration policies
that still favour those who are ethnically Japanese (Carens 181). However, considering that Japan is experiencing a demographic crisis with a shrinking birth rate
and an increasing life expectancy, the Japanese government may have to consider
reforming its immigration policies and welcoming people who are not ethnically
Japanese.
While the concern over a shrinking birth rate is valid, we must pause to
consider whether the concern in Japan is really over the shrinking total birth rate
or whether it is for the global decline of an ethnically Japanese population. When
polled, 65% of the Japanese population stated that they would reject immigration
reform, and this desire to maintain ethnic homogeneity “often manifests itself in
xenophobia” (Wohns 6, 7). Immigration reform may alleviate some difficulties in
Japan’s future, such as the financial difficulty of supporting a growing elderly population. However, increased immigration to Japan from many different countries
around the world may also lead to difficult societal discussions regarding traditional Japanese attitudes toward heterosexuality, marriage, the “male-breadwinner–
female-homemaker” mentality, and beliefs regarding births outside of wedlock.
Given these potential issues, the government’s top priority should be to support
and empower Japanese women in their career and family choices with immigration
reform as a secondary solution.
V. Conclusion
Japan is experiencing a demographic crisis in which the birth rate is decreasing
while the population is aging. These demographic changes are as a result of social
issues in Japan, such as the societal pressure on women to leave work once they
marry or become mothers. Additionally, Japanese individuals face increasing finan-
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cial difficulties in following the traditional Japanese lifestyle of “male-breadwinner–
female-homemaker,” which results in decreasing marriage rates. Even if the decline
of the ethnic Japanese population can be slowed by immigration, the status of
Japanese women must be improved regardless of whether they are or not (or wish
to be) mothers. As Wingfield-Hayes states, “women who are having children are
not working. Women who are working are not having children. Both are terrible
for Japan’s future.” Thus, improving the status of women in Japan will improve
the country’s demographic crisis, and perhaps in the future Japanese women who
choose to have both a career and children will not be termed “Devil Wives.”
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